Georgi Dimitrov to Stalin on the Question of “Social-Fascism”

Dimitrov to Stalin, 1 July 1934. Original in Russian. Type-written, with handwritten comments by Stalin.

1.7.34

From C. Dimitrov

Dear Com. Stalin!

The enclosed draft outline of [my] speech shows how I see the essence of the speech regarding the 2nd point of the agenda of the congress. In addition, I would like to raise in our forthcoming conversation the following questions:

I. On Social Democracy [1]

1. Whether it is correct to refer to social democracy indiscriminately as social-fascism. By taking such a position, we have frequently blocked our way to social democratic workers. [2]

2. Whether it is correct to consider social democracy everywhere and at all times the main social base of the bourgeoisie. [3]

3. Whether it is correct to consider all leftist s[ocial] d[emocratic] groups as a major threat under any conditions. [4]

4. Whether it is correct to treat all the leading cadres of s[ocial] d[emocratic] parties and of the reformist trade unions indiscriminately [5] as conscious traitors of the working class. One can expect, after all, that in the course of struggle quite a few [6] of today’s leading functionaries of the s[ocial] d[emocratic] parties and of the reformist trade unions will choose the path of revolution along with the s[ocial] d[emocratic] workers. It is in our interest to facilitate this transition for them and thus accelerate the transition of the s[ocial] d[emocratic] workers to our side.

5. Whether it is time to abandon useless discussion about the possibility or the impossibility of winning over the reformist trade unions instead of clearly formulating the task for its members to transform these trade unions into an instrument of the proletarian class struggle. [7]

6. The question of unifying the revolutionary and reformist trade unions without making the recognition of the hegemony of the Communist Party a necessary condition. [8]

II. On the United Front

1. The necessity to modify our united-front tactics in response to the changed conditions. Rather than using them exclusively [9] as a maneuver to expose social democracy without seriously attempting to forge a real workers’ unity through struggle, we must turn them into an effective factor in developing the mass struggle against the offensive of fascism. [10]

2. The necessity to reject the idea that the united front can only be built from below, and to stop regarding any simultaneous appeal to the leadership of a s[ocial] d[emocratic] party as opportunism. [11]

3. The necessity to launch the active initiative by the masses without petty tutelage of the Communist parties in their relations with the organs of the united front. Not to declare the hegemony of the Communist Party but to assure the actual leadership by the Communist Party. [12]

4. The necessity to radically alter our attitude toward s[ocial] d[emocracy] and non-party workers in all our mass work, agitation, and propaganda. It is essential to go beyond the general statements about the treason of social democracy, and to explain to the workers, concretely and patiently, what the social democratic policy of cooperation with the bourgeoisie is leading to and has already led to. [13] [It is essential] not to dump everything on the s[ocial] d[emocratic] leaders but to point out the responsibility of the s[ocial] d[emocratic] workers themselves, to make then think about their own responsibility and to look for the right way of struggle, etc. [14]

III. Regarding the Comintern Leadership

It is essential to change the methods of work and leadership in the Comintern, taking into account that it is impossible effectively to oversee from Moscow every detail of life of all 65 sections of the Comintern, which find themselves in very different conditions (parties in the metropolis and parties in the colonies, parties in highly developed industrial countries and in the predominantly peasant countries, legal and illegal parties, etc).

It is necessary to concentrate on the general political guidance of the Communist movement, on assistance to the parties in basic political and tactical questions, on creating a solid Bolshevik leadership in the local Communist parties, and on strengthening the Communist parties with workers while reducing the heavy bureaucratic apparatus of the ECCI.

It is essential to further promote Bolshevik self-criticism. Fear of this [self-criticism] has at times led to failure to clarify important political problems (questions of the current stage of the crisis and of the so-called military-inflationary juncture, the assessment and lessons of the Austrian events, etc.).

It is impossible to change the methods of leadership and work in the Comintern without partially renewing the cadres of the Comintern workers.

It is especially essential to secure close ties between the Comintern leadership and the Politburo of the VKP(b).

 

FOOTNOTES

[1] This subhead is also underlined by hand.

[2] In the margin, handwritten by Stalin: “As to the leadership – yes; but not ‘indiscriminate.’”

[3] In the margin, handwritten by Stalin: “Of course not, in Persia.”

[4] In the margin, handwritten by Stalin: “in the major cap[italist] countries – yes.”

[5] In the margin, handwritten by Stalin: “Objectively – yes; consciously – some [of them].”

[6] In the margin, handwritten by Stalin: “‘Quite a few’ – not; some – yes.”

[7] In the margin, handwritten by Stalin: “It is time.”

[8] In the margin, handwritten by Stalin: “Conditions are necessary.”

[9] In the margin, handwritten by Stalin: “Against whom is this thesis [directed]?”

[10] In the margin, handwritten by Stalin: “[We] must.”

[11] In the margin, handwritten by Stalin: “Nevertheless, the United Front from below is the foundation.”

[12] In the margin, handwritten by Stalin: “No doubt, but against whom is this thesis [directed]?”

[13] In the margin, handwritten by Stalin: “Correct.”

[14] In the margin, handwritten by Stalin: “Yes!”

From “Dimitrov and Stalin, 1934-1943: Letters from the Soviet Archives” by Alexander Dallin and F.I. Firsov, pp. 13-16.

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